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Abstract. The Unité d’Habitation is a seventeen-storey apartment block built between 1947 and 1952 in Marseilles, France. Today 
the construction of such a building, in almost any part of the world, would hardly be newsworthy; however the construction of the 
Unité d’Habitation not only attracted global interest at the time, but it can also be seen as one of the most influential buildings of 
the twentieth century. This was for a number of reasons. The architect was Charles-Edouard Jeanneret-Gris who, better known as 
Le Corbusier for most of his adult life, was probably the most influential architect of the twentieth century. The building, in many 
ways, initiated the hegemony of Modern Movement architecture throughout the world. But, perhaps most importantly, it was seen 
by much of the architectural profession as a prototype for how people should be housed in the future – with consequential major 
social, environmental and urban impacts. This paper examines the background of the design and describes the construction in detail. 
It also comments critically on the building’s suitability as a model for mass housing, revealing the extent of its various functional 
failings that have not, as far as the author is aware, previously been exposed.
Keywords: Unité d’Habitation, high-rise housing, Le Corbusier, functionality, modernism.
Introduction
This paper describes the design and construction of a se-
venteen-storey apartment building called the Unité d’Ha-
bitation that was built between 1947 and 1952 in the sout-
hern French city of Marseilles. The building was designed 
by the Swiss-French architect Le Corbusier who intended 
it to be a prototype for mass housing for the modern age, 
and can be seen as the culmination of his life’s work. It 
had an enormous influence on the architectural profes-
sion, and was the catalyst for the widespread adoption 
of Modern Movement architecture after World War II.
The development of the design of the building is 
explained, together with the relevant influences. Finally, 
a critical assessment of the technical aspects of the buil-
ding is presented, together with a commentary on its role 
as a model for mass housing.
Charles-Edouard Jeanneret-Gris becomes the 
architect Le Corbusier
Charles-Edouard was born on October 6th, 1887 in 
the Swiss watch-making town of La Chaux-de-Fonds. 
After a rather chequered early career in his home town, 
he left for Paris in January 1917, where he was to esta-
blish himself as an avant-garde architect, with the new 
name of Le Corbusier.
In 1923 he published what was to become his best-
known book Vers Une Architecture. Although it can 
be seen as a manifesto for a new architecture, it was 
hardly easy to follow. In 1926, Le Corbusier publis-
hed something that was easier to follow; it was called 
‘The Five Points of Architecture’ (Almanach… 1926), 
which were:
1. Buildings should be raised up on columns – pilotis.
2. There should be no internal load-bearing walls 
allowing a planning freedom – plan libre (Curtis 
1986: 42).
3. External walls should be non-load-bearing – 
façade libre.
4. Windows should be in long strips – fenêtre en 
longeur.
5. The roof should be flat and used as a garden – toit 
jardin.
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These five points were used extensively by Le 
Corbusier and for that matter by many other archi-
tects, the results of which can be seen in hundreds of 
buildings world-wide.
Le Corbusier and the housing problem
The design of houses tends to be central to the work 
of many architects, and Le Corbusier was no different. 
But his interest became wider than just the design of 
houses for individual clients; he felt he should be able 
to solve ‘the housing problem.’ By this he meant that 
there should be a universal housing type that would 
be suitable for people who were to live in the new mo-
dern world. In his book, Vers une architecture, he sug-
gests that a new architecture is needed for the ‘modern 
man’ and the ‘modern woman’, as he describes them 
(Le Corbusier 1927: 112).
His first attempt at mass housing was a proposal he 
made in 1914; it was called the Domino house. This was 
based on a six-columned, two-storey concrete structure 
that would form the basis of various housing arrange-
ments. It was never built1. His next attempt was called 
the Citrohan house, a model of which was exhibited at 
the 1922 Salon d’Automne. Inspired by the flat-roofed, 
whitewashed houses of the Greek islands and the Café 
Mauroy2, this flat-roofed house, raised up on columns, 
had a double-height living space with a sleeping area 
on a mezzanine.
During the 1920s Le Corbusier had three oppor-
tunities to provide housing that was more than just 
an individual house. At Pessac, near Bordeaux, he de-
signed a small housing estate for the workers emplo-
yed by Henri Frugès (Fig. 1), and in Paris he designed 
residential accommodation for Swiss students at the 
University of Paris, and a hostel for the Salvation Army.
The origins of the Unité d’Habitation
In 1929, Swiss businessman Edmond Wanner asked 
Le Corbusier to design a residential development in 
Geneva. Amongst the proposed buildings was an ele-
ven-storey building that exhibited two features that 
became part of the Unité design: apartments that 
were L-shaped in cross-section, and had access cor-
ridors at every other level (Fig. 2). The development 
was not built.
1  For the full, and rather tortuous, story of the Domino House 
see ‘The Domino Idea’ by Eleanor Gregh in Oppositions Winter/
Spring 1979: 61–87.
2  This Parisian café, much frequented by artists and intellectuals, 
had a double-height space and window, with the kitchen at the 
back under a mezzanine.
In 1933, Le Corbusier wrote, when promoting a 
four-storey housing scheme, ‘How I pity the people who 
think they will be freer, better off in these little houses! 
They’ll be hugging the ground while their neighbours 
in the four big buildings can gaze upon vast horizons 
and benefit from communal services’ (Le Corbusier 
1967: 295). He goes on to write ‘The fundamental ele-
ment of the city is THE DWELLING’ (Le Corbusier 
1967: 299).
In 1934, Le Corbusier signed an agreement to de-
sign a new district for Nemours in Algeria. Here he 
proposed eighteen individual blocks each of seventeen 
storeys. They were to be spaced out on a regular pat-
tern with ample space between them. Here again the 
apartments had L-shaped cross-sections with access 
corridors at every other level (Fig. 2). The project was 
not built, as, according to one writer ‘the problem was 
the large housing blocks which were probably frighte-
ning’ (Archive… 2005: 7)3.
Although Le Corbusier gave the impression that 
he was working on his own towards the Unité, there 
was a precedent in the Soviet Union. Architect Moisei 
Ginzburg was a member of the small but active artis-
tic and intellectual avant-garde; he was also a founder 
member of the OSA (Organisation of Contemporary 
Architects). He designed something called a ‘social 
3 Commentary by Jean-Pierre Giordani (Archive… 2005).
fig. 1. Workers’ housing at Pessac (photo by the author)













condenser’. The idea was to produce overlapping pri-
vate and public spaces called collision zones, where 
different communities could interact – as Ginzburg 
put it ‘the principal objective of constructivism … is 
the definition of the Social Condenser of the age’. In 
1928 Ginzburg got the chance to design one. Finished 
in 1932, it was called the Narkomfin building and was 
supposed to be a prototype of all subsequent state hou-
sing – in which it failed (Fig. 3).
This connection is not just speculative. Only oc-
casionally mentioned in writings about the Unité 
d’Habitation, there are numerous links between Le 
Corbusier and Ginzburg, and between the Unité 
and the Narkomfin building. Ginzburg knew about 
Le Corbusier’s work from the early 1920s, and, as 
editor of Sovremennaia Arkhitektura, he promoted 
Le Corbusier’s work from its first edition in 1926. 
In 1928, Le Corbusier went to Moscow, where he 
was already a celebrity in the architectural avant-
garde. When he left, he took with him plans of the 
Narkomfin building.
The beginnings of the Unité d’Habitation
In July 1944 a provisional French government had been 
set up under General Charles de Gaulle. In November 
1944, Raoul Dautry was appointed the Minister of 
Reconstruction and Urbanism. He asked Le Corbusier 
to make proposals for the housing of 14,000 new in-
habitants in Saint-Gaudens, for a new industrial zone 
next to the port of La Rochelle, and to re-build the 
half of Saint-Dié that had been wantonly destroyed by 
the retreating German army. Each proposal included 
a number of large apartment blocks, typically housing 
1600 residents. A combination of political problems 
and popular aversion to Le Corbusier’s proposals me-
ant that none went ahead (Archive… 2005)4.
The archival drawings for these projects mainly deal 
with town-planning issues; however there is an archi-
val set of 137 drawings, dated 1944, and called Unités 
d’Habitation, recherches. According to Le Corbusier, 
4  The clearest rejection was at Saint-Dié, where Le Corbusier’s 
proposals were rejected by virtually all sections of the popu-
lation; they wanted their town re-built as it was, which is what 
happened (see Commentary by Ivan Zaknic, Archive… 2005).
fig. 2. Cross-section for proposals at Geneva (a) and nemours (b) (created by the author)
a) b)
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these were the culmination of years of research, writing, 
‘… durant 43 années – une recherche vouée au logis des 
hommes’ (during 43 years – research devoted to dwel-
lings) (Le Corbusier 1950: 35). None of these drawings 
exhibits a convincing level of technical information 
(Fig. 4), seventy-seven of them being no more than un-
annotated free-hand sketches; so when Le Corbusier was 
called upon to design and build a Unité, his years of re-
search had not really prepared him for the task, except 
in a very general conceptual way.
The Unité becomes a reality
On 27th December 1945, the minister Raoul Dautry 
wrote to the municipal authorities in Marseilles saying 
‘I have decided that a Le Corbusier building will be 
constructed in your city. It is quite a challenging sche-
me, for it has to be built quickly, must contain a large 
number of apartments, must comply with all the latest 
health and safety regulations, must be of attractive de-
sign and in addition must contain some modern con-
veniences’ (Le Corbusier 1950: 135)5.
Le Corbusier set up a special organisation called 
ATBAT (Atelier de Bâtisseurs – Builders Workshop), 
which was to design this Unité. Under the overall 
control of Le Corbusier, the leaders were architect 
André Wogenscky and engineer Vladimir Bodiansky. 
The idea was to produce innovative integrated designs – 
5  Letter from Raoul Dautry to Jean Cristofol dated 27th December 
1945 (quoted in ‘Le Corbusier: The Unité d’Habitation in 
Marseilles’ by Jacques Sbriglio). Cristofol was the communist 
mayor of Marseilles. After World War II, communists filled 
many important posts in France, often promoting modern 
architecture (see ‘Quand communisme municipal rimait avec la-
boratoire urbain (1944-1986)’. Journées d’études 1er e 2 décem-
bre 2009 – Université Paris 1). It is possible that Dautry, who was 
not a communist and who knew Le Corbusier, took this action 
hoping it might inconvenience his political rivals.
it was to be ‘a synthesis of studies based on the crucial 
notion of a unified design concept’ (Sbriglio 2004: 137).
The Unité d’Habitation was to be more than just an 
apartment block; it was to be une cité-jardin verticale – a 
vertical garden city. Called a ‘unité d’habitation à gran-
deur conforme’ – a ‘large standard living unit’ – the idea 
was to house about 1600 people, but with additional fea-
tures such as shops, a hotel, a restaurant, a kindergarten, 
and communal sports, social and cultural facilities.
The concept for the building followed his research 
and his five points of architecture, together with the 
introduction of a new architectural ‘point’, the brise 
soleil – a fixed concrete sunshade. The sections of the 
apartments were based on the alternating L-shape, with 
balconies at either end. The shops, hotel and restau-
rant were on levels 7 and 8, and on the roof there was 
to be a complex garden that contained the communal 
facilities. The apartments were to be accessed from 
rues intérieures at every second level, and the whole 
building was to be raised up on pilotis, and supported 
on a structural table that Le Corbusier called le sol ar-
tificiel – the artificial ground (Fig. 5).
Apart from the ‘vertical garden city’ innovation, 
there were to be others. The most radical was the 
idea that above the artificial ground there would be a 
structural steel framework – a type of ‘bottle rack’ – 
into which individual apartments, prefabricated in a 
factory, would be slid into place. This idea was intro-
duced by Jean Prouvé and enthusiastically taken up 
by Le Corbusier and Bodiansky (Jenkins 1993: 13). 
However, the framework could not be of steel as there 
was a material shortage, and the design team rather 
tardily realized the impracticality of sliding in whole 
units, so this innovation was dropped. But the idea of 
prefabrication was not dropped; it was applied to pre-
cast concrete units on the façade and to interior timber 
panels for the floor and wall construction.
fig. 4. archive Drawing 30230 (source: fondation le Corbusier, © flC)
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grid of major transverse and longitudinal beams that 
carry the loads to the pilotis (Fig. 6). Longitudinally the 
pilotis are placed in pairs on every other grid at 8.38 m 
centres. Transversally the distance between the pilotis 
is 12.57 m (Fig. 6).
The system of heating uses ducted warm air. 
Although not an innovation as such, it was unusual in 
Europe at that time. Eight fans, fitted with heaters and 
humidifiers, supply the warm air. These are placed in 
pairs inside the artificial ground. Horizontal ducts, also 
within the artificial ground, distribute the warm air 
along the building, and these are connected to vertical 
ducts cast into the concrete walls. In each apartment, 
openings are made into the communal vertical ducts 
to supply its local duct system (Fig. 7).
The kitchens, bathrooms and WCs are all mecha-
nically ventilated. Like the warm air system, local duct 
systems within each apartment are joined to the verti-
cal ducts cast into the walls. Extract fans sited on the 
eighteenth level direct the stale air to a rooftop concrete 
‘chimney’.
There were other innovations as well. Le Corbusier 
wanted each apartment to be soundproof, so the in-
ternal partition walls consist of two independent tim-
ber-framed, plasterboard partitions, each sitting on 
independent timber and steel floor structures. The ends 
of the steel beams were to be mounted on individual 
blocks of lead, in an attempt to isolate them.
The main structure, built on a basic 4.19 m × 4.19 m 
grid, became reinforced concrete. The vertical structu-
re is a mixture of columns and walls, with the horizon-
tal structure being a mixture of beam-supported slabs, 
and individual beams that support secondary floors of 
timber panels supported on steel beams. The artificial 
ground supports the whole of the upper structure on a 
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Equipment within the artificial ground
Since 1943, Le Corbusier had been working on a 
new measuring system; which he called Le Modulor 
(Le Corbusier 1961). The result was two series of num-
bers called the Red and Blue Series. Le Corbusier deci-
ded that he should use his discovery to dimension his 
new project. He claims that it was used for the ‘General 
Plan and Section’, and for ‘An Apartment (plan and 
section)’, as well in many other situations (Le Corbusier 
1961: 131). A number of authors claim that use of the 
Modulor permitted the use of ‘just fifteen measure-
ments whose proportions are repeated in all the com-
ponents of the building, which despite its huge size ne-
vertheless remains on a human scale’ (Sbriglio 2004: 
143; Jenkins 1993: 9)6.
Detailed examination of the archive drawings 
shows this to be untrue (Fig. 8). It is interesting to note 
that even the main grid dimension of 4.19 metres is not 
a Modulor dimension.
6  “He [Le Corbusier] was proud to boast that in his Unité d‘Habi-
tation he only needed 15 standard measurements for the whole 
project, including dimensions of windows, doors, furniture etc.” 
(The Modulor II 2012).
fig. 7. The heating and extract schemes (created by the author)
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fig. 8. apartment cross-section showing Modulor (red & Blue) and non-Modulor dimensions 



















Journal of Architecture and Urbanism, 2015, 39(2): 103–115 109
Construction
The construction was started on 14th October 1947 
and the building was inaugurated on 14th October 
1952. There were 335 apartments of fifteen different 
layouts, although most of them, 199, were the standard 
L-shaped apartments that were one 4.19 m bay wide. 
This gave an internal width of 3.66 metres.
The predicted construction period of one year had to 
be extended to five years, and the estimated cost of FRF 
353,000,000 rose to an estimated FRF 2,800,000,000, 
nearly eight times the estimate. No exact final cost has 
ever been published. Shortly after completion, in May 
1954, the state-owned building was sold off, and it is 
now a private condominium (Fig. 9).
Critical assessment
There are no fewer than three monographs writ-
ten about the Unité d’Habitation in Marseilles (Le 
Corbusier 1950; Sbriglio 2004; Jenkins 1993) and bo-
oks about modern architecture are unstinting in their 
praise. Here are just three typical examples:
Peter Blake in 1960 – ‘…his admirers watched the 
Marseilles building go up and hailed it as the ultimate 
revelation of architectural truth’ (Blake 1960: 120).
William Curtis in 1986 – ‘The Unité took the 
Catechism and gave the word invincible aesthetic form. 
And it did this in a rugged vocabulary … wishing to give 
shape to a new, post-war state of mind’ (Curtis 1986: 172).
Kenneth Frampton in 2001 – ‘… the Marseilles Unité 
still stands as a breathtakingly heroic monument to a 
particular moment in time. Never was the utopian mo-
dern project so convincingly and thoroughly realized as 
in this work …’ (Frampton 2001: 164).
But not everyone was so enthusiastic; here are three 
dissenting views:
Lewis Mumford in 1963 – ‘Le Corbusier betrayed 
the human contents to produce a monumental aesthe-
tic effect. The result is an egocentric extravagance … 
(Mumford 1963: 81).
Peter Blake in 1974 – ‘…it is a spectacular hunk 
of sculpture – and a terrible hunk of living space… as 
an assemblage of dwelling units attuned to the need of 
twentieth-century living in plan, section, elevation, or 
general spatial organization, the Unité is a farce’ (Blake 
1974: 33)7.
Alexander Tzonis in 2001 – ‘Le Corbusier’s Unité 
points to the ecological devastation, the destruction of 
the natural landscape and the decline of the sense of joy 
of life’ (Tzonis 2001: 160–163).
None of these critical voices delves very deeply into 
the problems that were caused by flaws in the design of 
the building. What needs to be borne in mind is that 
7   This book, heavily criticising Modern Movement Architecture, is 
written by the same Peter Blake who had previously eulogised it.
fig. 9. The completed building (photo by the author)
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the Unité d’Habitation was not supposed to an iconic 
building, like for instance the Sydney Opera House, 
but to be a prototype for a building to be built in huge 
numbers all over the world. Even before the Marseilles 
commission, Le Corbusier had already made proposals 
for twenty-one such buildings.
The fact that it took five times longer to build than 
was anticipated, and that the final cost was at least 
eight times more than the initial estimate, is a clear in-
dication of general failure8. This was not due to any in-
novative ideas or untried technology going astray – all 
the construction materials and techniques used were 
tried and tested in other hands. The failure was due to 
a total lack of understanding of sensible construction. 
One of the authors of the monographs notes ‘Despite 
the gradual rationalisation of the design which Le 
Corbusier and Bodiansky had achieved subsequent 
to the preliminary scheme, the distance between 
theoretical intention and the practical realities of 
construction grew greater and greater’ (author’s use 
of bold text) (Jenkins 1993: 16). The existence of this 
‘distance’ is reinforced by examination of the archive 
drawings that exhibit an almost amateurish lack of 
technical accomplishment.
Building regulation non-compliance
Building regulations are usually enshrined in the 
law of the land, and exist to provide the users with 
security and comfort – they are framed to ensu-
re that current good practice is followed. Dautry’s 
instruction that Le Corbusier’s Unité was to ‘com-
ply with all the latest health and safety regulations’ 
could be thought superf luous: after all buildings 
have to comply by law.
Earlier, in 1944, Le Corbusier had already informed 
Dautry that he would accept the commission on the 
condition that ‘…I don’t have to comply with all the 
building regulations’ (Sbriglio 2004: 134). Le Corbusier 
has already voiced, in 1933, his opposition to current 
building regulations when he wrote ‘… the regulations 
become obsolete … time has come to change the regu-
lations’ (Le Corbusier 1967: 53). When the foundation 
stone was laid in 1947, planning permission was yet to 
be granted (Sbriglio 2004: 163). In October 1948, and 
again in November, with the building already under 
construction, the current minister of construction, 
Eugène Claudius-Petit, received reports from the 
8   The building is divided by expansion joints into four indepen-
dent sections. In an attempt to control spiralling costs, one 
Minister of Reconstruction and Urbanism suggested that only 
some sections be built, which would have left the building even 
more dysfunctional.
Conseil Supérieur d’Hygiene Publique de France advi-
sing him that the project should be stopped, as it vio-
lated the public health regulations.
This was because the kitchens and dining rooms 
were nearly eight metres from a window; and the 
kitchen, bathroom, WC and the children’s bedrooms, 
but above all the long access corridors, were entirely de-
pendent on mechanical ventilation (Calfas 1949: 406). 
Moreover the f loor to ceiling height of only 2.26 m 
was less than the legal minimum (Calfas 1949: 404)9. 
To resolve this ‘problem’, the minister summoned Le 
Corbusier and astonishingly told him ‘You are free of 
all restrictions and above the law…’ This was confirmed 
in July 1949 when the ministry issued a waiver exemp-
ting the project from the need for a building licence 
(Jenkins 1993: 17).
If the prototype did not comply with the building 
regulations, and needed a ministerial waiver to be le-
galised, what would have happened to the replicas? 
Assuming the regulations were not changed, as Le 
Corbusier wanted, either they would have to have been 
given a blanket waiver, thus making a mockery of the 
current building regulations, or each project would 
have been at risk.
Conceptual flaws in the structure
The structure of the building is conceptually flawed 
in numerous ways. The artificial ground is basically a 
transfer structure that serves no useful purpose other 
than complying, dogmatically, with Le Corbusier’s 
first point of architecture. Furthermore, various desi-
gn features augmented its expense. The columns were 
a complicated U-shape in section, with a tapering 
shape on elevation, thus needing complex formwork 
and reinforcement. To make matters worse, the ba-
ses of the columns were ‘hinged’ to the pile caps, by 
being supported in what were essentially ‘buckets of 
sand.’ This meant that the columns needed temporary 
support for stability until at least four columns had 
been built, together with the linking transverse and 
longitudinal beams.
Because the concrete walls contained ducts that 
required access from below, the transverse beams on 
the lines of the column had to be in pairs. To make the 
void within the artificial ground useable, all the trans-
verse beams had to be built with a number of openings, 
again complicating the formwork and reinforcement.
The density of the columns above the artificial 
ground, on a 4.19 × 4.19 m grid, is too high to reap the 
9   Le Corbusier had been advocating a ceiling height of 2.20 m 
since 1933 (see Le Corbusier 1967: 52).
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fig. 10. Secondary steel beam connection – Photo l1 (13)121 
(source: fondation le Corbusier, © flC)
economic benefi ts of reinforced concrete. Th e fact that 
there is a lack of repetition from fl oor to fl oor means 
that erecting the formwork for successive fl oors was 
slow and ineffi  cient. It is usual to support the formwork 
for a slab from the fl oor below, but here in a number of 
locations there is no concrete slab directly below, so the 
supports for the formwork needed to be three storeys 
high. Again this was ineffi  cient.
Probably the worst feature of the concrete structure is 
its transverse walls. Concrete walls are always expensive 
and slow to build because large areas of formwork are 
needed while – due to the reinforcement in the narrow 
walls – it is diffi  cult to place the concrete. Th e presence 
of the fi bro-cement duct formers, eff ectively narrowing 
the walls, creates further diffi  culties (see Fig. 7).
To carry the horizontal wind loads, the pairs of 
walls act as vertical cantilevers above the artificial 
ground. This load is shared between all the portals 
by the horizontally stiff  concrete slab of the artifi cial 
ground. Th ere are fi ft een pairs of walls10, but a simple 
calculation shows that fi ve sets of walls, three pairs at 
the expansion joints and one each at either end, would 
have been adequate.
Even when the concrete work was finished, the 
structure was still not complete: steel fl oor sub-structu-
res at levels 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 16 had to be 
installed. Th is must have been slow and diffi  cult, as 
the steel could not be craned in from above as the con-
crete slabs were in the way, so they would have been 
manhandled into position. Worse still was the fact 
that the steel was not fi xed directly to the concrete, 
but was supposed to sit on lead pads within steel ‘shoes.’ 
Th ese ‘shoes’ were to sit on the concrete beams. Here 
the problem would have been building tolerances. To 
overcome this it was proposed that the ‘shoes’ sat on 
beds of mortar whose thickness varied to give the cor-
rect level11. Th is would have meant time-consuming 
work under awkward access conditions12. In the event 
it appears that none of this happened, as the available 
construction photos show a variety of details, all of 
which can only be described as bodge-ups (e.g. Fig. 10).
Even with the all steel and concrete elements in pla-
ce, the structure was still not complete. Th e fl ooring 
above the steel beams was of timber, and, in an attempt 
to use ‘mass-production’ these were prefabricated pane-
ls13, whereas carpenters would have found it far easier 
to use ‘loose-fi t’ traditional joist construction.
10  See archive drawing no. 25352 (Archive... 2005).
11 See archive drawing no. 25938 (Archive… 2005).
12  Archive drawings nos. 25935, 25937 and 25938 show lead in a 
steel shoe bedded in mortar, whereas drawing no. 26679 shows 
the lead as a blob (Archive… 2005).
13  See archive drawing no. 25974 (Archive… 2005).
Th e external façade, balconies 
and mass-production
As Le Corbusier thought mass-production was the way 
forward for buildings14, one could expect it to appear 
in his magnum opus. With the abandonment of the 
impractical ‘bottle rack’ idea, ABAT still thought some 
type of assembly line could be used, though quite how 
is unclear. Jenkins notes in his monograph that ‘Th e 
assembly line … was to turn out to be little more than 
empty rhetoric’ (Jenkins 1996: 16). But precast con-
crete units were used, presumably to show that mass-
production was part of the project. Th ese units were 
mainly parts of the façade. Th e archive drawings show 
dozens of diff erent units15; the balcony for a standard 
apartment has no fewer than twelve units, which are 
of eight diff erent types. All these had to be combined 
with reinforced concrete in various ways to make up 
the balcony structure (Fig. 11).
From information shown on the drawings, it is 
possible to posit the following construction procedure:
1. Temporarily support the precast units (units 
numbered 1 & 2) that face the balcony edge 
beam.
2. Concrete the balcony slab, supporting beams and 
edge beam.
3. Place grille units on the edge beam (units num-
bered 34 & 34).
14  In fact, Le Corbusier had no experience of mass-production, 
and had even gone to the extent, on occasions, of having things 
hand-made to look mass-produced (see Curtis 1986: 57).
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4. Temporarily support the facing element for the 
top of the balustrade (units numbered 3 & 4).
5. Cast the beam along the top of the balustrade, at 
the same time cast the concrete shelf and suppor-
ting leg.
6. Install the vertical structural steel section betwe-
en the balconies.
7. Temporarily support the precast units that form 
the outer face of the vertical concrete element 
(units numbered 5 & 6).
8. Cast the vertical element, thus embedding the 
structural steel section, and allow horizontal ste-
el ties to protrude from the back of the column 
to be joined to the block wall.
9. Cast the brise soleil and its supporting beam.
10. Build the blockwork wall that separates the bal-
conies.
It is easy to see that organising so many different 
types of precast units would present considerable pro-
blems. Even after all this, the building was still not we-
ather tight, as the timber-framed glazed screens still 
had to be installed.
Shortcomings of the heating system
The main equipment is located within the artificial 
ground, but this is congested with single and twin 
transverse beams at every 4.19 metres – see Figure 7. 
So the idea that the huge area available within the arti-
ficial ground could be used as a plant room is seriously 
compromised. There is insufficient space around the 
fans, and poor access means that removing and ins-
talling equipment is difficult. The ductwork is convo-
luted, so installation and maintenance is also difficult. 
Furthermore, the convolution of the ductwork, not 
only inside the artificial ground but also inside the 
apartments, means that frictional air losses are high 
and require ‘over-sized’ fans, with consequent increa-
ses in initial and running costs.
Poorly conceived sound insulation
Le Corbusier thought he could control noise pollution 
by using various constructional devices. He proposed 
that some of the floor structures be mounted on blocks 
of lead, thinking that this would attenuate structure-
borne noise. Attenuation can be achieved when a soft 
material is used as the isolating medium, but lead is 
not soft – anyway these lead blocks were not installed 
(Fig. 10). Between apartments there were three layers 
of material. Two were layers of plasterboard fixed to 
timber framing, with a mineral wool backing; these 
formed the internal walls of the apartments. There was 
also a central thin block wall of gypsum16. This cons-
truction exhibits the common confusion of reducing 
noise transmission between spaces, where mass is ne-
eded, and achieving noise reduction within a space by 
‘soft’ enclosing surfaces – mineral wool for example. 
As the lower glazing on each exterior face of the apar-
tments was designed to open for its whole width, there 
was obviously a high possibility, especially in warm 
weather, of noise pollution from nearby apartments.














Concrete slab & beams
4 3
fig. 11. Standard balcony construction, showing the original PC element numbers 
(created by the author)
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Fire protection
Fires in buildings are rare, but are a constant possibi-
lity; so building users expect a degree of protection. 
Fire protection is complex; however two basic ideas 
predominate, one of awareness and the other of es-
cape. The awareness aspect not only means alarms, 
but also means that people in areas remote from the 
fire are given enough time to realise there is a fire. In 
practice this requires fireproof boundaries – floors 
and walls – which gives rise to the idea of boundaries 
fire-rated in hours. Having been protected by fire-
proof boundaries, the occupants then need fire-pro-
tected escape routes.
Most common building materials, with the excep-
tion of timber, are fireproof. But Le Corbusier, in his 
Complete Works, claimed ‘fireproof timber’ was used 
(Le Corbusier 1990: 189) – when a fire did occur, this 
turned out to be not the case (see below). In the case 
of the Unité, much of the structure is of reinforced 
concrete; however a number of floors and walls are 
of lightweight construction. In particular, separa-
ting floors between pairs of apartments are timber 
floors supported on steel beams with a plasterboard 
ceiling; this does not provide the required minimum 
fire rating of 1 hour. Within the apartments there is no 
effective fire separation between the different areas.
Normally the maximum distance to an escape 
route is considered to be between 9 m and 12 m; in 
these apartments the maximum route is over 20 m, 
and this is from a child’s bedroom. There is no alter-
native means of escape, and the escape route ends 
by passing through the kitchen, the source of most 
domestic fires. As already noted, all the apartments 
are interconnected by a duct system, which was not 
fitted with dampers. Such dampers had been common 
practice since the mid-1920s for vertical ducts in apar-
tment buildings (Fire dampers 1927: 213). This means 
that both smoke and fire have a route out of a burning 
apartment – and into other apartments connected by 
the duct system.
On 9th February 2012, there was a disastrous fire 
at the Unité. It started on the first floor and eventu-
ally spread upwards. Eight apartments and four hotel 
rooms were destroyed, and a further thirty were badly 
damaged by smoke and water (Fig. 12). The whole buil-
ding was evacuated, with only two-thirds of the apar-
tments remaining inhabitable. According to the fire 
chief, the high combustibility of the floors and walls, 
and fire-spread through the ducts, contributed to the 
seriousness of the fire17. The spread of the fire was a 
direct consequence of the lack of dampers in the ducts, 
and the low fire-rating between apartments.
Light and heat control
Le Corbusier was very concerned that his apartments 
should benefit from natural light, and designed full-
height, full-width glazing at either end. Learning from 
experience in his own apartment that internal condi-
tions become uncomfortable if the sun shines directly 
on this glazing (the greenhouse effect), Corbusier came 
up with the idea of fixed sunshades.
These were made of concrete and became famous, 
at least amongst architects, as brise soleils.
The idea is to block the high summer sun whilst 
allowing the low winter sun to enter.
The two illustrations of Figure 13a show the intended 
situation at noon in winter and summer. In summer, 
in the morning and evening, the sun’s low-angled rays 
are powerful. This means that the Corbusian solution, 
using the brise soleil, is only applicable to south-facing 
17  So far no final report on the fire has been made available (see 
Incendie... 2012).
fig. 12. fire damage (source: a) french fire service; b) Sud/Sud-Est architectures)
a) Part of collapsed fireproof floor b) Damaged vertical ducts
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façades. At Marseilles, the long axis of the building is 
north-south, so the main elevations face east and west, 
meaning that in summer they catch the hot morning 
and evening sun – that is, the building’s orientation is 
completely wrong for the brise soleils to function effecti-
vely. Consequently, almost all the residents installed old-
fashioned roller blinds to protect themselves (Fig. 13b).
Shopping streets, communal areas  
and the hotel
The Unité not only has apartments, but there are shops, 
a hotel and a restaurant on levels 7 and 8. On the roof 
there is a school, a running track, and various com-
munal facilities. The idea of including such extras in a 
residential development is hardly new: for instance, the 
huge Dolphin Square development, built in London 
between 1935 and 1937, has these and more.
The extra features had mixed outcomes. The ho-
tel has been in continuous operation from the out-
set but is strictly for Le Corbusier aficionados. One 
unhappy guest reported ‘Without a doubt the worst 
hotel we’ve stayed in … It may be of interest to arty 
architectural types … It is difficult to put into words 
how dismal and depressing this hotel is’ (Complete 
dump… 2012). The restaurant, with stunning views 
over the Mediterranean, is also still in use. The shops 
were a failure from the start. Not only was it diffi-
cult to service them seven storeys above the ground, 
but they could only attract trade from the residents, 
which was insufficient so they closed, as did the roof-
top school. The other facilities continue in occasional 
use, but the concrete grimness of the roof ‘garden’ is 
hardly an attractive leisure destination.
Conclusions
Considering how poorly the Unité fulfilled its inten-
ded role as a prototype, it is perhaps surprising that 
four more unités were built, three in France and one 
in Germany. They were all considerably modified co-
pies of the prototype; none tried to become vertical 
villages, they were just apartment blocks. Even this 
moderate success has to be set against the fact that, 
from 1945 up to his death in 1965, Le Corbusier pro-
duced schemes that included sixty-eight Unités. Only 
five were built, just over 7% of all those conceived.
Although, as this paper makes clear, the actual 
Unité d’Habitation at Marseilles was a failure as a 
prototype per se, it was conceptually – for architects 
at least – a brilliant success. The physical destruction 
wrought by World War II not only needed recons-
truction, but in many places was also seen as an 
opportunity for comprehensive slum clearance. What 
rose in place of the bomb-damaged slums were often 
high-rise blocks of apartments, inspired directly by 
the Unité or indirectly by Le Corbusier’s writings. As 
Phillip Powell, an architect with the London County 
Council, wrote in 1951, after visiting the almost com-
plete Unité, ‘…the possibility of twenty- or thirty-
storey blocks suggested by the Unité … seems to be 
the only rational approach to high-density housing’ 
(Murray, Osley 2009: 169). Consequently, all over the 
world, high-rise blocks of flats began to appear. But 
who was to live in them?
At the Unité it was never entirely clear what group 
or type of people was supposed to be housed, but as 
it was to be the prototype for housing worldwide, it 
could be surmised that it would suit Everyman. Le 
Corbusier’s approach was rather different; here again 
he was a pioneer – he was designing for a type of per-
son he thought should live in his buildings. There is 
no evidence that he was interested in ordinary people, 
he was designing for his idea of modern people – un 
homme type – a type of standard man that was a stran-
ge combination of monk, artist, athlete, worker and 
intellectual. As Professor Gans points out ‘… this in-
dividual turns out to be less like Everyman and more 
like Le Corbusier’s carefully cultivated self-image’ 
(Gans 2000: 20). She goes on to note of the Unité that 
‘as a private condominium it has housed those appreci-
ative of its intentions’ (Gans 2000: 113). Le Corbusier’s 
lead in ignoring the desires of Everyman was followed 
fig. 13. The intended function of the brise soleil (a) in winter and summer, and the retrofitted blinds (b) (created by the author; 
photo by the author)
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faithfully but, unlike the Unité, the high-rise bloc-
ks that appeared were for social housing – tenants 
without choice.
The social problems that the Corbusian solution cau-
sed are now well known. In the early 1980s, Professor 
Alice Coleman led a research team to find out what ar-
chitectural features are detrimental to social housing 
(Coleman 1985). Between 1979 and 1984, they surveyed 
4,099 blocks of apartments and 4,172 houses (Coleman 
1985: 2). Their results, supported by the evidence, were 
published in Utopia on Trial: Vision and Reality in 
Planned Housing, 1985. This disturbing book condem-
ned every Corbusian feature: high-rise structure, single 
entrance to the building, no external private space, the 
corridors with apartments on both sides, approach paths 
winding through greenery, massive slab blocks, blocks 
on stilts (pilotis), on site facilities, open plan, L-shaped 
apartments, and blank end walls.
Gradually these high-rise estates attracted pejorati-
ve names, such as ‘sink estates’ in Great Britain or ‘the 
projects’ in the United States. In France, these estates 
were known as HLM, the acronym for Habitation à 
Loyer Modéré (Moderate Rent Housing). HLM quickly 
passed into colloquial French to mean bad or low qu-
ality. This has led to a huge number of these buildings 
being demolished. The most notable was the demoli-
tion, starting in 1972, of the thirty-three eleven-storey 
blocks that made up the Pruitt-Igoe estate in St. Louis, 
USA. But while Corbusian high-rise blocks for soci-
al housing continue to be demolished, the high-rise 
condominium, such as London’s Barbican estate ‘… is 
a well-loved and sought-after development for many 
reasons. Its brutalist Fifties-style, inspired by such ar-
chitects as Le Corbusier …’ (Estate agents’… 2012).
The Unité d’Habitation, designed by Le Corbusier 
and built in Marseilles, can be seen as the building that 
changed the course of twentieth-century architecture. 
It inspired a new generation of architects to think that 
rejection of what is often simplistically called traditional 
architecture was correct, and that Le Corbusier was sho-
wing the way forward. As this new architecture proved 
vastly unpopular with the majority of the general public, 
this has led to polarised views on much of post-1945 ar-
chitecture. This polarisation continues today with, for 
instance, the strongly divergent views held about the 
Shard of Glass, an enormous tower recently completed 
in London.
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